Political Leadership And Collective Goods Pdf
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- Collective action problem
- Strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Africa
- Refiguring the Common and the Political
- Political Leadership and Collective Goods
Evelyn N. Mayanja is a Ph. Strengthening ethical political leadership is trepiditious, given the deeply engraved status quo that appeals to political elites who command power and benefit from the system through semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regime types.
Collective action problem
We propose an analytical framework to understand the role of these leaders based on the interaction of two dimensions: institutional transfer channels and operational capacity. Our findings challenge approaches which view collective action as an emergent decentralised group-oriented outcome. The paper contributes to the literature on leadership, entrepreneurship and collective action by identifying missing links and potential points of convergence.
It also sheds light on some of the challenges in promoting entrepreneurship as a means to advance sustainable development in rural communities. Following the constitutional reform in Colombia, Law 70 of established institutional mechanisms to protect the rights and identities of rural Black communities from the Colombian Pacific Basin as ethnic minorities. The law recognised their right to the collective property of their territories and created Community Councils CCs as internal administrative polities.
Today more than five million hectares of collective territories benefit 66, families in six Colombian departments. This massive land titling — one of the most ambitious in Latin America — entailed many challenges. First, communities had to organise to be eligible for the title. Second, they needed to create, implement and enforce rules to manage their resources. Ecomanglar aims to improve livelihoods beyond subsistence enterprises, setting it apart from the region's predominant form of economic endeavour.
This enterprise depends heavily on voluntary work, mission-driven commitments, sharing of critical assets and long-term expected returns financial and non-financial. These characteristics, and the fact that the enterprise is developed within collective territories, make literature on collective action and the commons relevant to inform our analysis.
We propose an analytical framework to understand the role of leaders in Ecomanglar based on the interaction of two dimensions: institutional transfer channels and operational capacity. This interaction configures four contextually determined types of leadership roles. Our framework may also illuminate the analysis of pertinent dynamics in similar cases. We argue that leaders in Ecomanglar can be thought of as institutional entrepreneurs , able to sustain collective action that fosters institutional change primarily through the provision of entrepreneurial opportunities.
Theoretically, our paper contributes to the literature of the commons by acknowledging that the role of leaders is at least as important as structural conditions to catalyse cooperative behaviour, thus challenging approaches which view collective action as an emergent, decentralised, group-oriented outcome.
By analysing this role in the context of cooperative and entrepreneurial solutions for sustainable development, the paper highlights the challenge of defining clear conceptual frontiers between the constructs of leaders and entrepreneurs. The paper proceeds as follows. Section one presents the relevant literature review, from which this case is analysed, particularly focusing on the literature on leadership and entrepreneurship and their relationship to the literature on collective action.
Section two explains the research method. Section three presents the socio-political context of the Pacific region and describes the history of Ecomanglar. Section four presents the results of the formal interviews conducted as part of our research. In sections five and six respectively we introduce the proposed analytical framework and advance some lessons derived from the analysis. The last section briefly presents some conclusions.
In its broader conception, the purpose of collective action is to achieve common objectives. Collective action theory mainly focuses on understanding interactions among group members, the making of rules, and mechanisms for monitoring compliance and solving grievances. Less attention has been paid to how collective action emerges and the roles key individuals play. Literature on leadership and entrepreneurship help to fill this gap.
Through a selective approach, this literature review identifies points of convergence and relevant gaps between the fields of leadership and entrepreneurship within the general frame of collective action including management of common-pool resources. The review will a briefly present key aspects of the literature on the commons, emphasising within-group analysis of heterogeneity and power relations; b show how leadership has been understood in the literature of collective action in general and the commons in particular; and c present key attributes of entrepreneurs and leaders in the literature on entrepreneurship and collective action respectively, to identify similarities, relevant gaps and potential contributions.
Abundant literature on collective action and management of common-pool resources followed the seminal contributions of Olson and Hardin Privatisation or state control were thus conceived as the only ways to prevent depletion Hardin Many prominent scholars in the field have systematically contested this claim. Global awareness of environmental sustainability has renewed the interest in local collective action and participatory development Bardhan and Ray If anything, the concern for the commons has become more relevant in recent decades.
Diverse approaches and traditions within the literature on the commons share a fundamental assumption: collective action results from a decentralised aggregation of actions by individuals who can advance group interests by making decisions under certain sets of rules. These rules define the institutional setting under which users access, manage, exclude, monitor, sanction and arbitrate resources Schlager and Ostrom Although by no means uncontested, this underlying causal narrative is applied to a wide range of phenomena in the social sciences Agrawal , From a systematic review of the contributions of three paradigmatic scholars of the commons — Ostrom ; Wade ; Baland and Platteau — Agrawal summarises two sets of findings.
First, members of small local groups can design institutions to manage resources sustainably and second, a set of conditions is positively related to sustainable local self-management of resources.
These conditions are grouped into four categories: characteristics of resources e. See also Ostrom Notably, the role of leaders and the impact of group heterogeneity are just two among many factors within the nature of groups.
The degree of correlation between those categories and the impact they have on the sustainability of commons institutions have proved difficult to assess unambiguously Baland and Platteau ; Poteete and Ostrom ; Agrawal Although collective action may be understood as the emergent outcome of aggregated individual decisions with no apparent centrally allocating mechanism, there is in principle no reason to expect that all members in a group will have the same influence over the processes and decisions leading to collective action.
Power imbalances and inequalities are key to the shaping of individual and collective choices Baviskar Literature on how inequality affects cooperation suggests that different forms of heterogeneity and unequal distributions of wealth among group members affect trust and reciprocity, thus hindering coordination for collective action Cardenas Most of this literature shows that asymmetries in the material benefits and costs for the users of common-pool resources affect cooperation.
Interestingly, this emphasis on material factors underemphasises the symbolic dimensions of power and authority Bardhan and Ray The study of leadership in collective action is relatively underemphasised and has received little empirical attention Lofland ; Klandermans cited in Diani ; Glowacki and von Rueden Only recently has experimental research in economics studied how leadership affects cooperation and coordination Sahin et al.
Many attempts to develop a comprehensive theorisation — a task yet to be fully accomplished cf. Aminzade et al. Recent literature tackles the issue of leadership in collective action more directly. Leaders seem to have social and cultural characteristics as well as particular skills that set them apart from other group members. These attributes confer distinctive roles on leaders which, played out in the context of particular dynamics of power and influence, affect the emergence, paths, and outcomes of collective action and social movements cf.
Morris and Staggenborg , Harrell and Simpson Literature shows that, relative to mutual monitoring and sanctioning, leadership is a solution for collective action problems, albeit in specific conditions Glowacki and von Rueden Although the emergence of collective action is determined by a wide variety of factors — e. Even in the case of overt rejection of hierarchical structures in radically decentralised collective action, the need for coordinating actions and political representation two archetypical functions of leaders still exists Melucci cited in Diani Although literature on the commons pays relatively little attention to the role of leaders, it does acknowledge — particularly from rational choice perspectives — four different functions for leaders: allocating resources and monitoring individual strategies and targeting sanctions Bianco and Bates ; distributing resources between private and public profit Esteban and Hauk ; assigning differential divisions of labour Colomer ; and determining stimuli to generate particular group reactions Van Belle Two broad conceptions underlie these functions.
First, the leader as a dictator or benevolent planner Bianco and Bates ; Calvert who is either appointed by the group or voluntarily engaged to solve coordination problems.
Second, the leader as a rational agent who has private interests different to those of the group. As shown by Bianco and Bates it is reasonable to assume that leaders will respect the group's objectives to increase the likelihood of success and retain their role.
However, group—leader goal divergence may arise: under certain circumstances, it might be more important for leaders to be individually successful than to maximise an expected collective outcome Colomer ; Van Belle ; Esteban and Hauk In the context of a decentralised solution to the problem of cooperation, Ostrom , , a , b argues that individuals can develop institutions that guarantee optimal cooperative solutions without the need of enforcement from leaders.
Mutual monitoring is proposed instead. Along these lines Glowacki and von Rueden argue that, in relatively large groups with considerably high costs of monitoring and sanctions, leadership is an efficient solution to the problem of collective action.
In fact, there is evidence that self-organisation i. Bianco and Bates show that leadership is more significant to initialise than to sustain cooperation. Close similarities exist between the attributes of entrepreneurs and leaders in the literature on entrepreneurship and collective action respectively. According to Schumpeter , entrepreneurs embody the driving force needed to develop an economy. In the literature of collective action, particularly resource mobilisation theories, leaders are viewed as individuals who mobilise resources and create organisations in response to incentives, risks and opportunities McCarthy and Zald , ; Oberschall cited in Morris and Staggenborg In the field of development, Lewis provides a review of four perspectives to analyse entrepreneurship.
Two are particularly relevant. Following Weber and McClelland, the modernisation school of development emphasises the role of culture and values as prerequisites for entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are thus seen as crucial variables, located within networks of kinship, information and capital and linking the socio-cultural environment with the rate of economic development Lewis The social anthropological perspective emphasises the relationships between entrepreneurs and the communities in which they operate.
In the literature of collective action Ostrom a differentiates private and public entrepreneurs based on their motivations, acknowledging how both can contribute to self-organised co-production of local services. In the literature of entrepreneurship Schoar identifies two types of outcome-based entrepreneurs: subsistence , i. Other typologies identify at least three types: conventional entrepreneur, social entrepreneur and institutional entrepreneur.
Specifically, institutional entrepreneurs mobilise resources to create new institutions or to change existing ones; theoretical boundaries between social and institutional entrepreneurs tend to blur when social innovations created by the former lead to large-scale change Dacin et al.
Conceptual frontiers dividing the constructs of entrepreneur and leader are still indistinct. This makes them significantly versatile, amplifying their role beyond mere initialisers of cooperation, as stated by Bianco and Bates Discourse, resource mobilisation, social capital associated with the position of the actor in networks or institutional configurations , and alliances and cooperation are enablers for institutional entrepreneurship Battilana et al.
A thorough account of the conceptual frontiers between the constructs of leader and entrepreneur is beyond the purview of this paper.
However, three assertions are possible: common attributes between leaders and entrepreneurs do exist, particularly in specific forms of entrepreneurship; frontiers between these constructs are porous since agents may interchangeably adopt characteristics of both as the case of Ecomanglar will show ; and rigorous assessment of whether this apparent adaptability responds to conceptual fuzziness, or to the versatility exhibited by agents, might be a relevant theoretical contribution.
In summary, this literature review suggests that it is important to consider the role of key individuals leaders and entrepreneurs within groups and organisations — and not only structural conditions or individual decision making — as catalysts of collective action and collective good provision Marwell and Oliver ; Morris and Staggenborg ; Glowacki and von Rueden The role of leaders may be more accurately looked at from the perspective of agency, particularly when they can potentially deviate from the pursuit of common interests to follow their own Meinzen—Dick et al.
The central inquiries in this paper arose from an ongoing research and pedagogical project started in with communities in the Colombian Pacific region, led by one of the authors. The main research purpose was to understand the impact of collective titling in the management of the territory. The pedagogical objective was to contribute to the development of Ecomanglar by providing support and commercial and financial advice from groups of graduate and undergraduate Management students.
Different groups of students, over a five-year period, participated in the project. The support of one of the authors was constant throughout, making sure that students understood the process in which they were involved. Several visits to Ecomanglar and a continuing relationship with the organisation motivated the paper's queries and also informed its analysis.
As the project unfolded as participatory action research, insights into the role of leaders as special kinds of members within the community in general — and the enterprise in particular — became particularly salient.
Strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Africa
We propose an analytical framework to understand the role of these leaders based on the interaction of two dimensions: institutional transfer channels and operational capacity. Our findings challenge approaches which view collective action as an emergent decentralised group-oriented outcome. The paper contributes to the literature on leadership, entrepreneurship and collective action by identifying missing links and potential points of convergence. It also sheds light on some of the challenges in promoting entrepreneurship as a means to advance sustainable development in rural communities. Following the constitutional reform in Colombia, Law 70 of established institutional mechanisms to protect the rights and identities of rural Black communities from the Colombian Pacific Basin as ethnic minorities. The law recognised their right to the collective property of their territories and created Community Councils CCs as internal administrative polities.
Comparatively, most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are endowed with natural resources, such as bauxite, diamond, gold and oil, than other countries in the developed world. However, in the midst of these resources potential, most of the countries are said to be poor, and fall sharply behind in the provision of essential services to improve the lives of their citizens. So, why are the services inadequately provided? On the contrary, several studies have argued that problems, such as corruption, weak institutional system, diverse population and ethnic polarisation in developing countries obscure the attainment of adequate delivery of public services. Interestingly, though both arguments hold different perceptions, they present fundamental issues affecting the creation of essential public goods in the developing countries.
PDF | On Sep 1, , Joe A. Oppenheimer and others published Political Leadership and Collective Good | Find, read and cite all the.
Refiguring the Common and the Political
Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods—defense, law and order, clean air, highways. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in
A collective action problem or social dilemma is a situation in which all individuals would be better off cooperating but fail to do so because of conflicting interests between individuals that discourage joint action. Problems arise when too many group members choose to pursue individual profit and immediate satisfaction rather than behave in the group's best long-term interests. Social dilemmas can take many forms and are studied across disciplines such as psychology, economics, and political science.
Political Leadership and Collective Goods
Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods—defense, law and order, clean air, highways. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in EN English Deutsch.
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